This paper develops new recursive methods for studying stationary sequential equilibria in games with private monitoring. We first consider games where play has occurred forever into the past and develop methods for analyzing a large class of stationary strategies, where the main restriction is that the strategy can be represented as a finite automaton. For a subset of this class, strategies which depend only on the players' signals in the last k periods, these methods allow the construction of all pure strategy equilibria. We then show that each sequential equilibrium in a game with infinite histories defines a correlated equilibrium for a game with a start date and derive simple necessary and sufficient conditions for determining if an arbitrary correlation device yields a correlated equilibrium. This allows, for games with a start date, the construction of all pure strategy sequential equilibria in this subclass.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose new recursive methods for studying repeated games with private monitoring. Our contribution is twofold. We present a model of repeated games with infinite histories -that is, games in which time extends infinitely backward and forward -and establish new set-based methods for verifying the equilibrium conditions for a large class of stationary strategies. For a subset of this class, strategies which depend only on the players' signals in the last k periods, these methods allow the construction of all pure strategy equilibria. We also establish a connection between equilibria of games with infinite histories and correlated stationary equilibria of traditional games with a start date and derive simple necessary and sufficient conditions for determining if an arbitrary correlation device yields a correlated equilibrium. This allows, for games with a start date, the construction of all pure strategy sequential equilibria in this subclass.
Games with infinite histories are interesting in their own right. Our model lets us abstract away from the inherent non-stationarity of the set of possible histories that plagues games with a start date. A long tradition in economic theory is to use the repeated game model to study the dynamic provision of incentives because in the case of perfect or public monitoring, such models offer a highly tractable stationary environment without end-ofhorizon effects. However, with private monitoring, the stationarity is broken by beginningof-horizon effects: the set of possible private histories changes through time and with it the possibilities to coordinate play among players. Our model of repeated games with infinite histories solves this problem.
Our formulation is simple. A joint strategy is a mapping from each player's privately observed infinite history to how he plays today. An equilibrium strategy is one where each player's mapping, given what he can infer regarding what his opponents have observed, is a best response to the other players' strategies.
We pay particular attention to strategies which can be represented as finite automata, that is, where private histories are grouped into a finite number of private states and a player's action depends only on which private state he is in. For this class, we develop recursive methods on sets of beliefs for each player about the private state of each of his opponents. The key is that if all players' strategies are finite automata, a particular player's private history is relevant only to the extent that it gives him information regarding the private states of his opponents (a point first made by Mailath and Morris (2002) ). This lets us summarize a player's history as a belief over a finite state space, a much smaller object (a point also made by Mailath and Morris (2002) ). The advantages of working with sets of beliefs are two. One is that it is necessary and sufficient to check incentives only for those beliefs lying on the boundary of the set of beliefs which can be generated by infinite histories (Lemma 1). The other advantage of working with sets of beliefs is that these sets can be readily calculated using recursive methods which look similar to those developed by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) but which operate on sets of beliefs rather than sets of continuation values (Lemma 4).
We also connect our results on games with infinite histories to the more traditional (and more problematic) formulation of games with a start date. In this part of the paper, we first show that any equilibrium of the game with infinite histories can be used to construct a correlated equilibrium of the corresponding game with a start date, where the correlation device sends each player a fictitious private history. We then develop methods for verifying whether an arbitrary correlation device signaling initial private states, when coupled with finite state equilibrium strategy of the game with infinite histories, forms a correlated equilibrium. Since sequential equilibria are examples of correlated equilibria (with degenerate signaling devices), and since strategies which depend only on the signals a player has seen in the last k periods are finite state strategies, these methods deliver necessary and sufficient conditions for constructing all k-history dependent pure strategy sequential equilibria.
Finding equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring is known to be difficult.
See, for example, the work of Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) , Chap. 12.
Among several difficulties, a central one is that with private monitoring, the recursive structure of public monitoring games is lost. The continuation of (sequential) equilibrium play in a game with private monitoring is not a sequential equilibrium, but rather a correlated equilibrium in which private histories function as the correlation device. But as Kandori (2002) notes, the correlation device becomes increasingly more complex over time. By introducing infinite histories, we make the correlation device stationary and regain some tractability. The mapping to correlated equilibria of games with a start date is then natural. In fact, using randomization or exogenous correlation in period 0 of the game to make it more stationary (and create interior beliefs about the private history of other players) has been suggested by Sekiguchi (1997) , Compte (2002) , Ely (2002) , and Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (forthcoming). We present a robust way of applying this method to construct a family of equilibria. nents. In contrast to belief-free equilibria, the equilibria we construct are belief-dependent; players' best responses do depend on their beliefs. Our work is also related to that of Mailath and Morris (2002) , who show robustness of finite-history dependent strategies in games with almost-public monitoring (and in Mailath and Morris (2006) show problems with robustness of infinite-history dependent strategies). Mailath and Morris show that for a strict k-history dependent equilibrium of a game with public monitoring, if the game is slightly perturbed to almost-public monitoring, the strategies still form an equilibrium. We can apply our results to this class of games and calculate exactly how much correlation is necessary. They provide a sufficient bound on the correlation, but leave finding a necessary and sufficient cutoff an open question.
Games with Infinite Histories
Consider a stage game, Γ, with N players, i = 1, . . . , N , each able to take actions a i ∈ A i . Assume that with probability P (y|a), a vector of private signals y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) (each y i ∈ Y i ) is observed conditional on the vector of private actions a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ), where for all (a, y), P (y|a) > 0 (full support). The current period payoff to player i is denoted u i (a i , y i ). That is, player i's payoff is a function of his own current-period action and private signal. Players put weight 1 − β on current utility and weight β on future payoffs and, as usual, care about the expected value of utility streams.
We start by considering the case (denoted Γ −∞,∞ ) in which time is assumed to extend infinitely both backward and forward. 
where I is the indicator function. A pair (σ, π) is said to be stationary if G(σ, π) = π.
B. Beliefs:
With full support all infinite histories occur with zero probability. So to define conditional beliefs we consider sets of histories.
For sets of infinite historiesẐ
This uniquely defines beliefs π-almost everywhere. However, for sets of infinite histories where player i has deviated, this formula has no implications since the measure π puts zero measure on the entire set of infinite private histories which can only be reached through player i's own deviation.
In games with a start date and full support, player i's beliefs can still be uniquely defined for histories where he has deviated. The full support assumption ensures that player i will never see evidence that his opponents have deviated (and thus will assume they haven't).
Beliefs regarding what his opponents have seen after t dates can then be defined for arbitrary (on or off path) specifications of player i's actions and signals using the strategy σ, the signal function P , and Bayes' rule. But this logic does not extend (as far as we can show) to games with infinite histories where player i has deviated an infinite number of times.
To see this, note that if player i deviated only in the most recent period, one can define beliefs conditional on player i's off path actions as follows: Let (a i , y i ) be an arbitrary action and signal representing player i's most recent action and signal and letẐ i be a set of infinite histories where player i has not deviated, representing his actions and signals for all earlier periods. In this case, the probability of (a −i , y −i ) ×Ẑ −i conditional on (a i , y i ) ×Ẑ i can be defined as
This logic generalizes to all histories where player i has deviated only a finite number of times, and thus there exists a date before which he has not deviated. But this logic does not generalize to infinite histories where player i has deviated an infinite number of times since one cannot pin down "initial" beliefs regarding the actions of the other players.
To handle these cases we consider trembling. That is, if σ i : A×Z i → (0, 1), all actions by player i are on path and conditional probabilities can be defined as in equation (1) . Given this, we say π i is a valid conditional belief measure if there exists a sequence
such that σ i,s : A × Z i → (0, 1), σ s → σ in the sup norm and π s → π and π i,s → π i in the weak- * topology.
C. Equilibrium Definition
Let v i (z|σ) be the function recursively defined by
A triplet (σ, π, π i ) is a Stationary Sequential Equilibrium of the game with infinite
3. For all i, π i is a valid conditional belief measure.
Finite State Strategies
This section develops methods for analyzing a particular (but large) class of strategies.
First, we assume that each player's strategy can be described as a finite automaton, and second, that along the path of play information depreciates (an assumption formally made below). We show how to verify whether or not a particular strategy profile of this type is an SSE-ih. Given this, we show how to calculate all pure strategy equilibria of an important subset of these strategies: those which depend only on the last k periods of a player's history.
Player i's strategy σ i can be described as a finite automaton if and only if his set of infinite private histories Z i can be divided into a finite partition Ω i such that σ i does not distinguish between histories z i andẑ i if both histories are in the same cell Since a player does not know the aggregate state ω, but instead knows only his own part of it, ω i , he will use all the information available to him (his private infinite history z i ) to form beliefs regarding ω −i ∈ Ω −i . For a particular infinite private history, a player's beliefs over the aggregate state of the game are simply a point in the (
private history z i . Let µ i (ω −i |z i ) denote the probability assigned to the particular state ω −i ,
For a strategy σ and corresponding beliefs π i , information is said to depreciate if for all > 0, i, ω −i , and infinite private histories z i , z 0 i , and z 1 i , there exists an s such that
This condition can be verified as follows: Let X(z i ) specify the probability of player i's opponents transiting from state ω −i last period to state ω −i this period conditional on player i observing z i today and his opponents following strategy σ. If there exists an s such that for all
This condition is immediately satisfied if player i's strategy σ i (for all i) depends only on the last k periods of y i (as opposed to depending also on his action realizations).
An example of a strategy where information does not depreciate would be if player i plays whatever action he played in the previous period.
Given a strategy σ and its corresponding state space Ω, we can define expected payoffs in aggregate state ω as:
where ω + (a, y, ω) is the next-period state given current-period state ω and new (a, y). That is, V i (ω|σ) is the expected utility of player i if he knows the aggregate state (including the private states of the other players) and he and all the other players mechanistically play the 2 If player i's beliefs were µ i orμ i s periods ago, beliefs today after (z i,1 , . . . , z i,s ) are, respectively,
. If the differing beliefs are pushed t periods back in time and an extra t periods of data are added for dates s + 1 to s + t, player i's beliefs become, respectively,
. Premultiplying the transition matrix X(z i,s ) . . . X(z i,1 ) by a matrix with no zeros uniformly decreases the distance between the rows. strategy σ.
For arbitrary beliefs m i ∈ ∆ D −i and a strategy σ, let
We have now defined expected payoffs as functions of private states ω i and beliefs over the private states of the other players m i , instead of expected payoffs being functions of a player's infinite private history z i .
Rather than considering separately the beliefs m i ∈ ∆ D −i that a player will have after some infinite history, it is useful to consider subsets of beliefs. Let 
Proof. 
If: Suppose incentives hold for beliefs
is the set of (a i , y i ) pairs such that player i's private state transits from ω i to ω i . The successor of belief
In the above formula, the ratio is the probability of the event (a −i , y −i ) conditional on (a i , y i ).
This probability is then summed over all (a −i , y −i ) realizations consistent with the other player(s) moving from state ω −i to ω −i , averaged over the probability of the other player(s) being in state ω −i according to beliefs m i . Then
The T operator works as follows: Suppose one takes as given the beliefs of player i over the private state of the other players, ω −i , last period. Bayes' rule then implies what player i should believe about ω −i this period for each realization of (a i , y i ). If there exists a way to choose player i's state last period, the beliefs of player i over the private states of his opponents last period, and a new realization of (a i , y i ) such that Bayes' rule delivers beliefs
In effect, the T operator gives, for a particular collection of belief sets M i , the belief sets associated with all possible successor beliefs generated by new data and interpreted through σ.
Lemmas 2 through 4 show that the T operator can then be used to generate the true sets of valid beliefs M * i . We write
and That information depreciates ensures that beliefs converge to the actual probability of ω −i conditional on the entire infinite history. Given this, m i ∈ M * i (ω i ).
Let T s (M i ) denote the application of the T operator s times on M i and ∆ = (∆
(that is, M i = ∆ implies for all ω i , all beliefs are acceptable).
Proof. Examination of the T operator shows it to be monotonic in that if
and so on. Thus T s (∆) represents a sequence of (weakly) ever smaller included sets, guaranteeing that the limit exists. From Lemma 2,
While Lemma 4 shows that M * i is the largest fixed point of T (and thus M * one need iterate no further in order to verify that σ is an equilibrium.
So far, we have focused on the finite state strategies σ and left implicit the corresponding measures on infinite histories π and π i . For a given finite state strategy σ, one can construct π as follows: Strategy σ and the function P define a Markov transition matrix X mapping the aggregate state ω yesterday to the aggregate state ω today. That information depreciates implies that this matrix has a unique ergodic distribution, m e (ω). The probability of an infinite sequence ending in a particular
The probability of an infinite sequence ending in (z 1 , z 2 ) (where again the most recent real-
, and so on.
Likewise, the conditional probability measures π i can be calculated using Bayes' rule similarly conditioning only on the last s periods, for all s.
Finally, note that the ability to verify whether or not a finite state strategy σ such that information depreciates is an SSE-ih (when coupled with the appropriate beliefs π and π i ) allows one to calculate all such pure-strategy k-history dependent SSE-ih for the simple reason that there exist a finite number of candidate pure strategies.
Two Examples
In this section we construct two simple examples. The first is based on Mailath and Morris (2002) . Consider the two player partnership game in which each player i ∈ {1, 2} can take action a i ∈ {C, D} (cooperate or defect) and each can realize a private outcome y i ∈ {G, B} (good or bad). If m players cooperate, then with probability
both players realize the good private outcome. With probability (1 − ) , player 1 realizes the good outcome while player 2 realizes the bad. (Likewise, with this same probability, player 2 realizes the good outcome and player 1 the bad.) Finally, with probability p m 2 +
(1 − p m )(1 − ) 2 , both players realize the bad outcome. Essentially, this game is akin to one in which p m determines the probability of an unobservable common outcome and is the probability that player i's outcome differs from the common outcome. Thus when = 0, outcomes are public, and when approaches zero, outcomes are almost public. Payoffs are determined by specifying for each player i the vector
Next consider perhaps the simplest non-trivial pure strategy: tit-for-tat. That is, let each player i play C if his private outcome was good in the previous period and D otherwise. This is a two-state strategy with Ω i = {R, P }, for "reward" and "punish." For infinite histories ending in y i = G, player i is in state ω i = R (and the strategy calls for the player to play C) and for all other histories, player i is in state P where he plays D.
Thus, for computation purposes, the set M * i (ω i ) is simply an interval specifying the range of probabilities that player −i realized a good outcome last period, given that player i is in state ω i . The mapping T from Section 3 then maps a collection of two intervals (one for each ω i ) to a collection of two intervals, and the results in that section imply that starting with the unit interval for each of these and iterating delivers the true intervals M * i (R) and M * i (P ).
For β = 0.9, p 0 = 0.3, p 1 = 0.55, and p 2 = 0.9 and a payoff of 1 for receiving a good outcome and a payoff of -0.4 for cooperating, we can easily verify that the static game is a prisoner's dilemma and that tit-for-tat is an equilibrium of the public outcome ( = 0) game. believes that his opponent is in state R with probability 0.908, he wishes to deviate and play D rather than C. Thus, with = 0.03, tit-for-tat is not an equilibrium, since, by construction, there exists an infinite private history for player i ending in G such that he believes the other player saw a good outcome last period with probability 0.908 (the lower end of the interval).
Simply put, being only 91 percent sure your opponent saw the same good signal as you (and thus will cooperate along with you) is an insufficient inducement for cooperation in this repeated prisoner's dilemma.
From Mailath and Morris (2002) we know that in this example, for sufficiently small , tit-for-tat is an equilibrium, and obviously for sufficiently high it is not. Our analysis of this example allows us to go further: to establish exactly for which epsilons the profile is an equilibrium. That is, our methods allow us to consider whether any proposed strategy is an equilibrium strategy, regardless of whether the signals are nearly public. In fact, one can construct equilibria which depend on the private signals not being nearly public.
Consider a two-player battle of the sexes game where each player i ∈ {1, 2} can take action a i ∈ {Ballet, Hockey} and each can realize a private outcome y i ∈ {G, B} (good or bad). If both players take the same action, they both realize a good outcome with probability 0.9, both receive a bad outcome with probability 0.08, and player i realizes a good outcome while player −i receives a bad outcome with probability 0.01. If the players take differing actions, they both realize a good outcome with probability 0.05, both receive a bad outcome with probability 0.05, and player i realizes a good outcome while player −i receives a bad outcome with probability 0.45. If player 1 realizes a bad outcome, her payoff is zero, and if she realizes a good outcome, her payoff is 3 2 if she played Ballet and 1 if she played Hockey.
Likewise, if player 2 realizes a bad outcome, his payoff is zero, and if he realizes a good outcome, his payoff is 3 2 if he played Hockey and 1 if he played Ballet. As in the previous example, β = 0.9.
Our methods can be used to check if the following simple strategy is an equilibrium:
if a player's private outcome was good, repeat last period's play regardless of whether it was on or off path. If his (or her) private outcome was bad, switch away from last period's play regardless of whether it was on or off path. This strategy is a two-state automaton incentives hold on the boundaries of these two intervals. But note they hold precisely because this is not a game with almost public signals. That is, suppose player 1 is in state P layHockey and deviates by playing Ballet, while believing (with high probability) that player 2 is in state P layHockey. If she realizes a bad outcome, the function P above implies she believes player 2 most likely received a good outcome (and thus will not switch states), and thus it is in her interest to follow the equilibrium by playing Hockey next period. If P were such that she believed player 2 also had a bad outcome, as would be the case if outcomes were almost public, after this deviation, player 1 would no longer be willing to follow the strategy.
Games with a Start Date
In this section we connect our results in Section 3 for games with infinite histories to the more traditional class of infinitely repeated games where there exists a start date, t = 0.
We first show how to construct, for each SSE-ih, a correlated equilibrium in the corresponding game with a start date in which the correlation device sends fictitious infinite private histories to each player. Then, as we did in Section 3, we restrict ourselves to finite state strategies where information depreciates and show how, for each finite state SSE-ih, to construct a correlated equilibrium in which the correlation device signals an initial state ω i for each player i, as opposed to signaling infinite private histories. Finally, we develop conditions for checking whether an arbitrary correlation device which signals starting states, when coupled with a finite state strategy σ, is a correlated equilibrium. Since sequential equilibria are examples of correlated equilibria (with degenerate signaling devices), these methods deliver simple necessary and sufficient conditions for constructing all k-history dependent pure strategy sequential equilibria of private monitoring games with a start date.
If players receive private signals s i ∈ S i at the beginning of the game, a joint strategy (z i,1 , . . . , z i,t )|σ) be the expected discounted payoff to player i if he knows the joint signal s, every player's private history (z j,1 , . . . , z j,t ), and he and the other players follow 
)).
In effect, through the use of fictitious histories, we have constructed fully stationary strategies in a game with a start date -a somewhat difficult task since in a game with a start date, the calendar date is automatically encoded into a player's history through the length of that history.
Lemma 5. Take as given an SSE-ih (σ, π, π i ) of Γ −∞,∞ . For the game with a start date, Γ 0,∞ , let S = Z, x = π, and σ i,t (a i,t |s = (ẑ i,1 , . . .), (z i,0 , . . . , z i,t )) = σ i (a i,t |(z i,t , . . . , z i,0 ,ẑ i,1 , . . .)).
Then (σ, x, π i ) is a correlated equilibrium of Γ 0,∞ .
Proof. The result immediately follows from (σ, π, π i ) being an SSE-ih and that σ i,t reacts to a fictitious history signal, or an actual history with a fictitious history prepended to it, as 
, and for all (a i , y i ),
In words,T eliminates an element of M i (ω i ) if there exists a successor belief which is not in
represents a sequence of (weakly) ever smaller included sets, guaranteeing that the limit, denoted M , exists.
Lemma 7. Take as given a finite state SSE-ih (σ, π, π i ) of Γ −∞,∞ where information depreciates. For the game with a start date, Γ 0,∞ , the strategy σ i,t (a i,t |ω i , (z i,0 , . . . , z i,t−1 )) = σ i (a i,t |ω i (ω i , z i,1 , . . . , z i,t−1 )) constitutes a correlated equilibrium when coupled with correla- 
is a sequence of ever smaller (in the sense of set inclusion) collections of compact sets so the
, but that means that there exists a history of the length s such that player i has a profitable deviation after that history. For example,
for some ω i , and then incentive compatibility does not hold for the tit-for-tat strategy. The point of Lemma 7, however, is that any correlation device which delivers π i ∈ M can be used as well. In particular, since M (ω i = R) includes the belief that ω −i = R with probability 1, putting all probability on ω = (R, R) delivers a correlated equilibrium. But since this correlation device is degenerate, we have constructed a sequential equilibrium where both agents cooperate in the first period and play tit-for-tat after that. Likewise, since M (ω i = P ) includes ω −i = R with probability 0, we have also constructed a sequential equilibrium where both agents defect in the first period and play tit-for-tat after that. Finally, since M (ω i = R) does not include the belief that ω −i = R with probability 0, we have demonstrated that having one player cooperate and the other defect in the first period (and playing tit-for-tat after that) is not a sequential equilibrium. Thus we have exhaustively determined which starting conditions, when coupled with a particular SSE-ih, are and are not sequential equilibria.
This logic generalizes. Since the number of pure-strategy k-history dependent strategies where information depreciates is finite (and we have derived methods for checking whether each is an SSE-ih) and the number of pure-strategy possibilities for determining play in the first k periods of a game with a start date is also finite (and we have derived methods for determining whether each of these starting conditions satisfy incentive compatibility), we have constructed methods for determining all pure-strategy k-history dependent sequential equilibria (such that information depreciates) of traditional games with a start date.
Concluding Remarks
The equilibria we have characterized here can be used to construct others. For example, we can construct sequential equilibria for games with a start date in which players mix in the first period and then follow pure stationary strategies conditional on the initial randomization simply by letting the players draw randomly their private fictitious histories (a construction similar to Sekiguchi (1997) ). Or, we can also design some other non-stationary strategies in the first few periods and append to it one of our equilibria. Furthermore, once we find an equilibrium for a discount factor β, we can apply Ellison's (1994) method and construct an equilibrium for discount factor β (2005) show that for some games with public monitoring, the set of payoffs achievable with public k-history dependent strategies (an important subset of finite state strategies) is strictly smaller than the whole set of PPE payoffs (at least for strongly symmetric strategies). We don't know how rich the class of games with that property is and whether the same is true for sequential or correlated equilibria of games with private monitoring.
